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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between mortgage leverage and con-
sumption around the 2008 financial crisis. Using data from the UK’s Family Ex-
penditure Survey and Wealth and Asset Survey, we first show that high-leveraged
households made larger cuts to consumption following the financial crisis, and this
was largely driven by young households. Second, using a life-cycle framework,
we investigate the channels by which high-leveraged households may have reduced
consumption by more than others. Our key finding is that credit supply tightening
is the main driver of the empirical co-movement between pre-crisis leverage and
consumption growth after 2008.
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1 Introduction
UK Household consumption fell sharply during the 2008 financial crisis, by 4 percent
overall. However, the fall was even more drastic for households with high levels of
mortgage: over 10 percent on average. To understand the effects of the crisis it is essen-
tial to explain this first-order response. In this paper, we focus on understanding and
quantifying the different channels through which mortgage status affected households’
consumption behaviors in the last crisis.
Using household-level data from the UK’s Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and from
the Wealth and Asset Survey (WAS), we first document the empirical relationship that
households with a mortgage cut their consumption by more than households with no
mortgage. We show that the higher a household’s pre-crisis leverage (as measured
by their loan-to-income ratio) the more they cut their consumption in the crisis pe-
riod. Moreover, we find that the relationship between leverage and consumption growth
varies significantly with the observed time period and with age. On the one hand,
this co-movement seems to be present in the crisis period only. When we examine non-
recessionary periods, we find no significant impact of household leverage on consumption
behavior. On the other hand, young households cut their consumption by roughly twice
as much as old households for the same level of leverage over the crisis.
Having documented these empirical irregularities, we then turn to understanding the
drivers that led indebted households to cut their consumption by more than other
households during the crisis. We consider four channels by which the recession may
have directly affected households: a fall in the level of income, rising uncertainty around
future income, a reduction in the supply of credit, and a decline in house prices. As
we argue below, all four channels can generate a positive co-movement between leverage
and consumption growth.
Lack of data makes it impossible to test the channels empirically, therefore we build a
life-cycle model with a realistic mortgage market to assess the quantitative importance
of these four mechanisms. Our simulation results show that the most important driver
of the empirical co-movement between pre-crisis leverage and consumption growth in
the data was the exogenous reduction in the supply of credit after 2008.
Consider how the four channels affect households with different pre-crisis leverage ratios.
The first channel works through a negative shock to income. When households face a fall
in their income level, they cut their consumption. However, the size of the cutback may
differ across households not just because of where they are in their life-cycle but also
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because of liquidity constraints. After a negative permanent income shock of the same
size, younger households may cut their consumption by more than older households as
they are likely to be more liquidity constrained. As young households are typically more
leveraged than old households, we may also observe that more leveraged households
decrease their consumption by more than others after a negative income shock.
The second channel plays a role when the recession is associated with greater uncertainty
around future income. As uncertainty increases, households increase their precautionary
savings, and hence consume less. Again, depending on where the households are in their
life-cycle and consequently what their leverage is, they could quantitatively behave very
differently.
The third channel works through an exogenous reduction in the supply of credit. Since
the crisis, banks significantly decreased the acceptable mortgage loan-to-value ratios
(LTV) at which they were willing to lend, which made it increasingly difficult for house-
holds to finance consumption by topping up mortgages. As a result, households close to
the acceptable leverage threshold were unable to withdraw additional equity from their
housing wealth. This change may affect high-leveraged households the most, leading
their consumption to fall by much more than other households.1
The final channel we consider is a fall in house prices, which is very similar to the
credit supply channel. As house prices fall, mortgagors face a reduction in their housing
wealth, which increases their LTV ratios. These high LTV households would then be
unable to withdraw additional equity from their house, which consequently may lead
them to decrease their consumption by more than other households.
Although the four channels have a similar qualitative effect in encouraging a positive co-
movement between leverage and consumption growth, building a structural model allows
us to investigate these channels independently. In particular, we use model simulations
to show which channel leads to a similar consumption response to what we observe in the
data. We find that the observed pattern of consumption in the recent recession is best
explained by a model in which the recession is associated with a credit supply shock.
The literature linking consumption growth to changes in incomes and house prices is
extensive. For example, Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Attanasio et al. (2012) show
that consumption growth for young and old households varies by the type of shock. Pos-
itive income (and income expectations) shocks drive consumption growth among young
households, whereas positive house price shocks are the main driver of consumption
growth for old households.
1It would also affect first time buyers. Whereas before the crisis first time buyers only needed to
save 5% of the value of a house, the required down payment increased significantly after the crisis hit.
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There is also a substantial literature addressing the question on whether housing wealth
is used as buffer saving. Skinner (1996) shows that younger households adjust their
consumption when there is a change in their housing wealth. Hurst and Stafford (2004)
show that households use their housing wealth to refinance their mortgage in order to
smooth consumption over their life-cycle. Campbell and Cocco (2007) find a correlation
between house prices and predictable changes in consumption, which is more pronounced
among credit constrained households. The study by Berger et al. (2016) also confirms
that the size of housing price effects on consumption may be substantial and sensitive
to the level of household debt.
There are, however, fewer studies that analyze the relationship between mortgage and
consumption behavior. Dynan (2012) uses household level data to show that households
with high LTV have experienced larger declines in spending during the crisis, after con-
trolling for wealth effects and other factors. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) show that the
decline in US consumption following the crisis was greater in counties with higher lever-
age prior to the crisis. Baker (2013) finds that spending by highly leveraged households
has been more sensitive to income fluctuations and that it is likely to have increased the
depth of the recent recession.
More recently, Cloyne and Surico (2017) use UK data to show that households with a
mortgage adjust their consumption in response to tax changes by much more than house-
holds with no mortgage. The authors argue that the lack of net liquid wealth and the
transaction costs associated with liquidating housing assets make indebted households
more liquidity-constrained. An income shock, therefore, may elicit a bigger response to
consumption for mortgagors.2 Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2017) study the role of
housing markets and mortgages. They find that access to credit affects home-ownership;
and that changes in housing wealth (through changes in house prices) account for about
half of the changes in non-durable consumption. Finally, the work by Wong (2015)
shows that different types of households may respond differently to shocks. In particu-
lar, she finds that the consumption of young, leveraged households is more responsive
to monetary policy shocks than other types of households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and
motivation for our study by presenting the empirical relationship between leverage and
2While this seems supportive of our income shock channel, there is an important difference between
their analysis and ours. Cloyne and Surico (2017) examine the effects of tax changes on income, but
the majority of their observed tax changes were in fact designed to boost income. We are specifically
interested in the impact of a negative income shock in the period after 2008, whereas their analysis
is for the period before the crisis. This difference is crucial as a household’s response to positive and
negative income shocks is likely to be asymmetric given that the first relaxes, while the second triggers
a liquidity constraint.
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consumption growth. In Section 3, we give more elaborate evidence of this relationship
using a regression analysis. In Section 4, we detail our theoretical life-cycle model
together with our solution strategy and model calibration. In Section 5, we present the
results. In Section 6, we discuss the implications of our analysis and conclude the paper.
2 Consumption and Leverage
Aggregate data from the UK statistical agency, the Office for National Statistics (ONS),
show that household consumption was growing at an annual rate of 4% per year in the
decade running up to the crisis. It collapsed in 2009 by a massive 7 percentage points–
from a peak of roughly 3% a year to -4% in the depth of the crisis. Since 2009 (and at
least until 2012), it grew at rates below its historical average (Figure 1).3
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Figure 1: Annual Real Consumption Growth
Source: Office for National Statistics. Final household consumption expenditure, chained-volume
measures, excluding imputed rents (housing).
These aggregate data potentially mask a large degree of heterogeneity across households
for a number of reasons– for example because of differences in financial position, age or
education. In Figure 2 we disaggregate consumption data and plot annual consumption
growth for households with different housing tenures. The purple line plots renters; the
green line plots homeowners with no mortgage debt; the orange line plots homeowners
who have a mortgage loan of less than twice their income; while the blue line plots
3The level of consumption was also very weak and has not recovered since.
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homeowners who have a mortgage loan of more than twice their income. As Figure 2
shows, households with different housing tenures differed in their consumption behaviors
in the two decades preceding 2012. The most striking difference however, arose over the
great recession. While all households reduced their consumption in the recession, the
biggest–and so far unprecedented– consumption adjustment came from those with the
highest leverage. Compared to the 4% average drop in consumption in 2009, households
with a mortgage loan (or debt) to income ratio (LTI) of two or more decreased their
consumption by over 10%.
Our goal in this paper is to understand the mechanisms that caused the behavior we see
in Figure 2. Simply put, what led high-leveraged households to cut their consumption
by much more than low-leveraged ones? In this, and the following section, we focus on
a deeper empirical analysis of the available data.
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Figure 2: Annual Real Consumption Growth by Tenure
Source: Family expenditure survey (FES). Consumption is total weekly real non-housing consump-
tion per household. Low LTI households are those with a mortgage loan-to-income ratio of less than
2; high LTI households are those with ratios of 2 or more. Homeowners with no mortgage account
for 32% of households; Low LTI and High LTI both account for 19% each; and Renters account for
the remaining 30% share. FES data are scaled to match the ONS National Accounts.
2.1 Data
We use data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), a micro data-set containing
detailed information on household expenditures of 5,000 to 6,000 households per year. A
two-week expenditure diary accompanies the questionnaire. The FES provides the best
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household-level consumption data in the United Kingdom. It also contains information
on outstanding levels of mortgage debt from 1992. However, our main analysis predom-
inantly covers the period between 2006 to 2012. We focus on households of working
age, where the head is aged between 21 and 69. Waves of the FES also switch between
calendar and fiscal year collection multiple times, so to maintain consistency, we convert
all data to calendar years.
We use weekly non-housing expenditure as our measure of consumption4, and deflate
all data using the National Accounts consumption deflator. We focus only on secured
debt as the FES has only scant data on unsecured debt. As mortgage debt accounts for
the majority (>80%) of all debt, excluding unsecured debt is unlikely to change the big
picture message.
The Survey contains no information on assets. To address this, we merge the FES with
data from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) at the cohort level. The WAS is a panel
survey covering 20-30,000 households in each wave. The survey began in 2006 and we use
its first three waves for our analysis: Wave 1 from mid- 2006 to mid-2008, Wave 2 from
mid-2008 to mid-2010 and Wave 3 from mid-2010 to mid-2012.5. Specifically, we merge
mean values of real housing wealth and real gross non-housing financial wealth6. This
allows us to construct measures of LTV, in line with how most of the literature defines
leverage. While we use this definition throughout the paper to support our results, the
lack of asset data availability before 2006 mean that we cannot rely on it for regressions
we run prior to 2006 (for robustness checks). As such, our main definition of leverage
is LTI. This is also an appropriate measure to use for the UK for two reasons. First,
this is a ratio that UK banks rely on as a measure to ration access to credit (although
it is secondary to LTV). Second, it allows us to test the impact of falls in income on
household leverage. Nevertheless, we find similar effects at the cohort level regardless of
which method of leverage we use.
Unfortunately, because the FES are an annual time-series of cross-sections, we cannot
control for individual-level heterogeneity or track changes over time. Instead, we con-
struct a synthetic panel, using date of birth, as first suggested in Deaton (1985a) and
in line with what others using the FES have done in the past (see Attanasio and Weber
4The methodology for calculating housing consumption in the FES is not consistent with that used
in the National Accounts. For homeowners, the FES only measures mortgage payments rather than
using a measure of imputed rents like that of the National Accounts. In common with papers who use
this micro-data, we scale incomes, consumption and debt by the ratio of its FES total for all households
to its National Accounts aggregate.
5While the time periods from the WAS wave do not exactly match the calendar time periods in
our analysis, they nonetheless provide a reasonable approximation as assets tend to change slowly over
time. Using data from part of a WAS wave risks the data not being fully representative.
6This excludes bank deposits.
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(1994), Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), or Campbell and Cocco (2007) as exam-
ples). The premise of this approach is that while we cannot track individual households
over time, we can track groups of households that share similar characteristics. Typi-
cally, households are grouped in cohorts using their year of birth (as age is exogenous).
However, depending on the nature of the question being asked, other groupings have
also been constructed, such as years of education or housing tenure status. This method
allows us to condition debt at its pre-crisis levels and to consider the effects on different
households, albeit at a lower level of disaggregation than is possible at the household
level.
We use two different cohort definitions to ensure the reliability of our results. The
first definition uses year of birth to construct the cohorts. For example, everybody
born in 1956 belongs to one cohort. This is the cleanest definition of a cohort because
birth year is deterministic– people cannot move across cohorts over time. However, it
also pools people with and without mortgage debt making it harder to tease out the
relationship between debt and spending patterns. To discriminate between these, we
consider a second definition: splitting each birth year by whether or not they have a
mortgage7. The main disadvantage of the second cohort definitions is that the sample
split is endogenous (households choose their mortgage status). In Appendix A.4 we use
the method suggested by Moffitt (1993) to construct predicted values of leverage. Our
results continue to hold.
We pool two years together to construct our time periods. We define 2006/2007 as the
pre-crisis period and 2009/2010 as the period thereafter (we later extend the analysis to
2011/2012 too)8. This pooling makes the time periods of the data more comparable to
the WAS waves, where each wave also spans two years. It also allows us to increase the
number of data points that is used to create each cohort level observation.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
When we think about the relationship between leverage and consumption growth, we
need to focus on three variables that determine this connection: income, mortgage and
consumption. These variables vary both over the life-cycle and across time. In this
7There is a tradeoff between the mean number of observations used to create each cohort cell and
the total number of observations overall. We drop cohorts with less than 50 observations per cell.
82009-2012 was a period of prolonged weakness: Aggregate levels of consumption, the total wage
bill, and house prices all fell to their lowest level since a decade ago; unemployment rose to its highest
level since the mid-1990s; and high LTV products became very difficult to access. Indeed, very high
LTV products were taken completely off the market and were impossible to access during this time
period.
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section, we examine how they evolved between 1992 and 2012 using cohort analysis.
Figure 3 plots these three key variables between 1992-2012. Panel (a) plots mean real
incomes, panel (b) plots mean real consumption and panel (c) plots mean outstanding
mortgage debt. Cohorts are defined by 10-year-of-birth intervals. Each line shows the
mean for a variable of interest for a given cohort. For example, the purple line in panel
(a) represents the mean income for households that were born between 1940 and 1949.
The left-most data point of the line is from the earliest available survey in 1992, whereas
the right-most data point of the line is from the latest wave in 20129. Moving from left
to right shows the evolution of income, consumption and debt for different generations
as they age over time.
All of the plotted variables - income, consumption and outstanding mortgage debt - are
hump-shaped over the life-cycle and peak before retirement, consistent with the theory
that households accumulate mortgage debt when young and convert it to assets as they
age, thereby smoothing consumption.
Panel (a) shows how the incomes of all cohorts have flattened out, falling from about
2007 onward. In fact, some younger cohorts earned less than their immediate preceding
cohort when they were at the same point in their life-cycle. This pattern is also mirrored
in Panel (b). However, compared to income growth, consumption growth has been less
rapid both between and across cohorts. Turning to mortgage debt, Panel (c) shows that
younger cohorts have much more debt compared to older cohorts when they were of
the same age. Furthermore, debt grew at much faster rates than income. The financial
liberalization of the 1990’s, which made credit more readily available, may have played
a significant role in the increase of mortgage debt among young households.
Since the rise in mortgage debt may also be a reflection of the rapid rise in house prices
over the last two decades, in Figure 4 we plot real outstanding mortgage debt and real
housing wealth. We use repeated cross-section data from three different periods: 1995,
2007 and 201210. These graphs suggest that the beneficiaries of the rising house prices
were the older cohorts. Even though younger cohorts took on the lion’s share of the
increase in mortgage debt, older cohorts had the biggest increase in housing wealth. One
might therefore expect big differences in household spending growth across households
of different age groups.
9The youngest and oldest cohorts have shorter lines on the charts as they were either younger than
21 or older than 70 in the earlier/later waves of the survey.
10As no wealth information exists in the FES, data for 2007 and 2012 lines in Panel(b) are taken
from the 2006/2007 and 2011/2012 WAS waves. As WAS only dates back to 2006/2007, data for 1995
are taken from Bunn and Rostom (2014) using the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). To ensure
data accuracy of these spliced datasets, we plotted the 2006/2007 WAS line against the 2005 data taken
from the BHPS. We get the similar results.
9
We report summary statistics from the FES and WAS in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Life-cycle behaviors of key variables by age across cohorts
Source: Family Expenditure Survey (FES) from 1992 - 2012, for head of household aged 21-69 at
the time of the survey. Each line represents a 10-year date of birth cohort. Incomes are net of tax.
Consumption excludes housing expenditures. Mortgage debt is outstanding mortgage debt. Data
are deflated using the 2011 consumption deflator.
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Figure 4: Average household debt and housing wealth by age across years
Source: Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for Panel (a). British Household Panel Study (BHPS)
and Wealth & Assets Survey (WAS) for Panel (b). In Panel (b), data for 1995 are taken from Bunn
and Rostom (2014); whereas data for 2007 and 2012 are from WAS Waves 1 and 3 respectively. All
data are for head of household aged 21-69 at the time of the survey. Data are deflated using the
2011 consumption deflator.
3 Empirical Determinants of the Link Between Con-
sumption and Leverage
After the graphical description of the relationship between leverage and consumption
growth in the previous section, in this section, we give a more elaborate analysis of this
observation. We control for different factors which we think might affect the observed
connection between leverage and consumption growth, but these variables will undoubt-
edly still be endogenous. Therefore, the goal of this section is to establish the existence
of this co-movement rather than attribute causality. Our regression strategy is moti-
vated by the availability of data: we run our cohort regressions on the change between
2006/2007 and 2009/2010. In Appendix A.5 we extend our analysis by substituting
2009/2010 with 2011/2012 instead. Our results continue to hold.
3.1 Baseline Regression
In our baseline estimation, we are interested in exploring Figure 2 further. In particular,
whether we can still see a relationship between leverage and consumption in a simple,
reduced form estimation, without aiming to identify these coefficients. Instead, we want
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to observe whether leverage, as measured by the LTI, before the crisis (2006/2007) was
associated with a change in consumption during the period of weak growth (2009/2010).
We estimate the following cross-sectional equation at the cohort level:
∆cit = α0 + α1LTIit−1 + α2∆yit + α3∆wit + α4xit + eit (1)
Where ∆cit is the change in log non-housing consumption for cohort i in 2009/2010,
denoted by t. LTIit−1 is the ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to after-tax income
in 2006/2007, denoted by (t − 1). yit is log after-tax labor income; wit is a vector
of log housing wealth and log financial wealth; while xit is a vector of demographic
characteristics, such as change in household composition. As discussed before, FES
contains no information on wealth, hence wealth data is taken from the Wealth and
Asset Survey (WAS). Notice that equation (1) is similar to the one used by Dynan
(2012).
We are interested in the coefficient on the pre-crisis leverage, α1, since it shows the effect
of leverage on consumption growth after controlling for income and wealth. Considering
Figure 2 again, we expect this coefficient to be negative: higher pre-crisis leverage is
expected to lead to bigger falls in consumption growth.
Table 1 reports the regression results from equation (1). Each column represents one of
the cohort definitions as specified in Section 2.1. In both columns, the coefficients on
pre-crisis LTI are negative and statistically significant. They are also broadly similar in
magnitude across all definitions. On average, we find that a one unit increase in the pre-
crisis leverage (e.g. LTI of 3 instead of 2) is associated with about a 2.6 percentage-point
decrease in consumption growth.
Notice that ideally, we would also like to control for variations in permanent income,
income uncertainty, down payment requirement and house prices when running equa-
tion (1). Interacting these variables with pre-crisis LTI would help us get closer to
identifying the driver of the observed co-movement between leverage and consumption
growth. Unfortunately because of data availability (e.g. we have no consistent house-
hold panel data for this time period), we cannot check this using the micro-data. (In the
following Section we discuss how we use the structural model allows for a more detailed
counterfactual analysis).
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Cohort definition Year of birth Mortgagor /
Non-Mortgagor
[1] [2]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt−1 -0.027** -0.026***
(0.014 (0.008)
∆Yt 0.653*** 0.546***
(0.132) (0.117)
∆ Housing wealtht -0.022 0.073**
(0.068) (0.035)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.002 0.004
(0.022) (0.023)
Constant -0.025 -0.028**
(0.023) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 46 77
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ∆Ct is the change in
log non-housing consumption in 2009/2010, denoted by t. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax income,
net of mortgage interest payments at t. LTIt−1 is the ratio of mortgage debt to annual income in
2006/2007, denoted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial wealtht are changes in housing
wealth and total financial wealth respectively. Controls are the change in the number of adults
and children. Each column represents a synthetic panel regression from 2 pooled years, constructed
using either [1] year of birth, or [2] year of birth, split by mortgage status.
Table 1: Loan-to-Income
3.2 Regressions by Age
Household debt accumulation is disproportionately skewed towards younger households.
Also, narrative evidence suggests that the Great Recession was harsher on younger
households than it was on older households, as they had bigger falls in their income
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and were more likely to become unemployed. Tighter credit conditions may have also
affected younger households more than older households.
Sample split: Young Old
[1] [2]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt−1 -0.035*** -0.020*
(0.010) (0.010)
∆Yt 0.327* 0.756***
(0.157) (0.141)
∆ Housing wealtht 0.082* -0.022
(0.039) (0.079)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.016 -0.001
(0.037) (0.030)
Constant -0.007 -0.041**
(0.024) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26 51
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample is split by whether
the household head is younger than 40 years or otherwise. ∆Ct is the change in log non-housing
consumption in 2009/2010, denoted by t. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax income, net of mortgage
interest payments at t. LTIt−1 is the ratio of mortgage debt to annual income in 2006/2007,
denoted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial wealtht are changes in housing wealth and
total financial wealth respectively. Controls are the change in the number of adults and children.
Regressions are from a synthetic panel using 2 pooled years, where the panel is constructed using
year of birth and mortgage status.
Table 2: Results by Age
In order to test whether the changed conditions during the Great Recession had a bigger
effect on young household’s consumption behaviors than on the old, we split our sample
into two by age. We define young households as those who are younger than 40 years
of age and old households as those 40 years or more. Our results are reported in Table
2. The coefficients on LTIt−1 are 1.75 times greater for young households than for old
households, suggesting that young households with high leverage cut back consumption
the most during the great recession.
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3.3 Regression in Non-Crisis Periods
One challenge to our results is that the effect we are finding may not be specific to only
recessions. To counter that, we repeat our analysis using three non-crisis time periods
between (t − k) and (t). The first time period is between 1997/1998 and 2000/2001;
the second time period is between 2000/2001 and 2003/2004; and the third is between
2003/2004 and 2006/2007. Table 3 reports results for these placebo tests11. In all cases
we find no effect– the coefficients are small and insignificant.
We interpret this to mean that the drivers that lead indebted households to change their
consumption are specific to recessionary shocks. We discuss the effects of these drivers
in the next section.
11The equations do not include wealth variables as WAS did not exist before 2006.
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Time period, t: 2000/2001 2003/2004 2006/2007
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt−1 -0.002 0.010 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
∆Yt 0.611*** 0.517*** 0.459***
(0.061) (0.051) (0.125)
Constant 0.014 -0.013 -0.032**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79 79 79
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column represents
a regression for a different time period. ∆Ct is the change in log non-housing consumption in t;
where t is [1] 2000/2001, [2] 2003/2004, or [3] 2006/2007 for each column respectively. ∆Yt is the
change in after-tax income, net of mortgage interest payments at t. LTIt−1 is the ratio of mortgage
debt to annual income in 2006/2007, denoted by t− 1; where t− 1 is [1] 1997/1998, [2] 2000/2001,
[3] 2003/2004 for each column respectively. Controls are the change in the number of adults and
children. No controls for wealth, as data does is not available before 2006. Regressions are from a
synthetic panel where the panel is constructed using year of birth and mortgage status.
Table 3: Non-Crisis Period
3.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we test different specifications to check the robustness of our results. We
summarize those below, although all robustness checks are detailed in Appendix A.2.
First, we use a more commonly used definition of leverage measured by the mortgage
loan-to-value ratio (LTV), in keeping with the way other studies commonly define lever-
age. This specification allows us to compare our results to other studies in the literature.
Using the housing wealth data from WAS, we construct loan-to-value ratios and estimate
a similar equation to equation (1) but substitute LTIs with LTVs:
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∆cit = β0 + β1LTVit−1 + β2∆yit + β3∆wit + β4xit + eit (2)
The results are reported in Table 4. On average, we find that a ten unit increase in
the pre-crisis leverage, as measured by LTV, led to a 14-percentage-point decrease in
consumption growth. When we split the sample by young and old, we also find that
leverage had a much bigger effect on young household’s consumption growth compared
to old households. More specifically, we find that a ten unit increase in the pre-crisis
LTV led to an 18-percentage-point decrease in consumption growth for young households
(compared to only 12-percentage-points for old households). Hence, our conclusion is
similar to the case where we measure leverage by loan-to-incomes: there is a negative
connection between leverage and consumption growth even after controlling for income
and wealth. Results from equation (2) using our year-of-birth cohort definition can be
found in Appendix A.3.
Our second robustness check is related using mortgage status to create the cohorts. The
main criticism of this definition is that mortgage status itself is a choice variable, so the
construction of the panel does not just rely on deterministic variables.
Following Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), we use predicted mortgage status (in-
stead of actual status) to construct an alternative panel specification12. The detailed
method and results are discussed in Appendix A.4. In summary, we get the same results
using the predicted variables as we would with the actual variables. This result is not
that surprising, since data from the WAS suggest that around 90% of the households
who had a mortgage in the first wave of the survey, between mid-2006 and mid-2008,
still had a mortgage two years later. We can therefore assume that over shorter periods
- such as when looking at changes over the financial crisis period - mortgage level and
status are fixed.
12We also use predicted debt for the LTI ratio.
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Sample split: Everyone Young Old
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTVt−1 -0.142*** -0.177*** -0.118*
(0.039 (0.049) (0.062)
∆Yt 0.551*** 0.328* 0.755***
(0.117) (0.164) (0.142)
∆ Housing wealtht 0.074** 0.083** -0.020
(0.035) (0.039) (0.079)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.005 0.019 -0.001
(0.023) (0.036) (0.030)
Constant -0.028** -0.007 -0.042**
(0.012) (0.024) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77 26 51
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample is split by whether
the household head is younger than 40 years or otherwise. ∆Ct is the change in log non-housing
consumption in 2009/2010, denoted by t. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax income, net of mortgage
interest payments at t. LTVt−1 is the ratio of mortgage debt to housing wealth in 2006/2007,
denoted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial wealtht are changes in housing wealth and
total financial wealth respectively. Controls are the change in the number of adults and children.
Regressions are from a synthetic panel using 2 pooled years, where the panel is constructed using
year of birth and mortgage status.
Table 4: Loan-to-Value
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Sample split: Everyone Young Old
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt−1 > 2 -0.049** -0.093*** -0.010
(0.020) (0.031) (0.028)
∆Yt 0.529*** 0.310* 0.730***
(0.118) (0.157) (0.148)
∆ Housing wealtht 0.086** 0.086** 0.033
(0.035) (0.040) (0.076)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.008 0.018 0.004
(0.025) (0.041) (0.030)
Constant -0.038*** -0.011 -0.048***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.017)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77 26 51
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns 2 and 3, the
sample is split by whether the household head is younger than 40 years or otherwise. ∆Ct is the
change in log non-housing consumption in 2009/2010, denoted by t. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax
income, net of mortgage interest payments at t. LTIt−1 > 2 is an indicator variable for whether
LTI was > 2 in 2006/2007, denoted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial wealtht are
changes in housing wealth and total financial wealth respectively. Controls are the change in the
number of adults and children. Regressions are from a synthetic panel using 2 pooled years, where
the panel is constructed using year of birth and mortgage status.
Table 5: LTI > 2
Third, we run an alternative estimation with an indicator variable for whether a cohort
has an LTI greater than two13. This gets us closest to what we show in Figure 2.
The results, which are reported in Table 5, show that, overall, consumption growth for
cohorts who have an LTI greater than two is associated with a 4.9 percentage point fall
13The mean loan-to-income value at the cohort level is equal to two.
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between 2006/2007 and 2009/2010. But the effect is very stark when households are split
by age– young households decreased their consumption growth by 8 percentage points
more than old households. In Appendix A.6, we take this analysis further by testing
for non-linearities in leverage by creating additional flags for cohorts with LTIs greater
than 2.5 and 3. We find that the greater the LTI threshold, the greater the consumption
response.
Fourth, we extend the post-crisis time period to 2011/2012. We find that extending our
estimation period gives us a similar size and significance of the coefficients on the loan-to
income ratio, suggesting the effects were persistent.
So far, we have used micro-data at the household and cohort level to show the relevance
of leverage status on households’ consumption behaviors during the financial crisis. We
demonstrated three empirical facts of consumption growth. First, both low- and high-
leveraged households cut their consumption in response to the crisis. Second, high-
leveraged households cut their consumption by more than low-leveraged ones. Third,
this was mostly driven by young households.
4 A Life-Cycle Model with Mortgages
In a regression analysis it is impossible to disentangle how the consumption behavior
of high- and low-leveraged households is affected by potentially different shocks around
the recession. We cannot convincingly test whether our empirical findings were mainly
driven by income shocks, credit market shocks or house price shocks. For this reason,
we build a theoretical model and simulate the behavior of a large number of households.
The model enables us to disentangle the effects of different channels, and to show which
of them can lead to consumption patterns similar to those we highlighted in the previous
section, i.e. the three empirical facts of consumption growth.
4.1 Model structure
We start with a simple model of life-cycle consumption and savings in a dynamic stochas-
tic framework. Households maximize their present discounted lifetime utility, which de-
pends on nondurable consumption and the consumption of a flow of housing services.
They can move resources between periods by investing in either a one-period bond or
in housing, which also provides a flow of housing services. They are only allowed to
have collateralized debt, and only housing can serve as collateral. Households face un-
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certainty in two dimensions: idiosyncratic uncertainty over labor income and aggregate
uncertainty over house prices.
Utility function. Households have a CRRA utility function in the composite good,
which in turn is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of nondurable consumption, Ct and housing
services, St.
u(Ct, St) =
(
Cαt S
1−α
t
)1−ρ
1− ρ (3)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the weight on nondurable consumption in the composite good, and
ρ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for the composite
good.
Budget Constraint. We write the standard intertemporal budget constraint for the
household in terms of cash-on-hand. Households start any period t with a given amount
of non-housing wealth, Wt, and receive an uncertain labor income, Yt, that adds up to
cash-on-hand, Xt. Given the amount of cash-on-hand, households decide how much to
consume, Ct, to invest in housing, It at unit price Qt, to repay on existing mortgage
debt, ξt and how much new mortgage to take out, ϑt. Depending on the size of the
housing investment, households also have to pay the corresponding adjustment cost, Θt,
which we specify later.
Xt+1 = R
X(Xt − Ct −QtIt −Θt − ξt + ϑt) + Yt+1 (4)
By deciding on the amount of consumption, housing investment, mortgage repayment
and new mortgage take-out, households determine how much to save in a one-period
bond, which yields a risk-free return, RX . The non-housing wealth available in the next
period is consequently the current period bond augmented by its rate of return, while
the next period’s cash-on-hand is the sum of the next period’s non-housing wealth and
next period’s labor income.
Housing. In addition to the one-period bond, households have access to housing. Hous-
ing investment, It, adds to their existing housing, Ht. Hence the law of motion for the
stock of housing is
Ht+1 = Ht + It, H0 = Hmin > 0 (5)
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The stock of housing is a continuum and bounded from below at Hmin > 0. We do not
model renting explicitly as our main focus is on the behavior of leveraged homeowners.
Instead, we consider households with the minimum stock of housing to be renters. In the
United Kingdom, the rental market is separate from the owner-occupied housing market:
rental properties are, on average, significantly smaller than owned ones. For example,
the 2012 English Housing Survey reports that 80% of properties smaller than 50 square
meters are rental, whereas larger properties are predominantly owner-occupied.
Purchasing a home is usually associated with significant costs such as time spent looking
for the preferred house or contractual costs such as legal fees. To capture these types of
costs, we allow for adjustment costs Θ(It) ≥ 0, which we assume to depend on the value
of housing investment
Θ(It) = δQtIt (6)
Housing generates housing services, St, which yield instantaneous utility. There is no
rental market in our model, so housing services can only be consumed by owning. We
assume that there is a linear technology between housing and housing services.
St = bHt (7)
Housing can be used as collateral for mortgage loans. Households can get collateralized
debt at a constant price of RM up to a given fraction, 1−ψ, of the value of housing. So
at the moment of the first mortgage take-out, the following inequality has to hold
Mt ≤ (1− ψ)QtHt (8)
where Mt is the mortgage and ψ can be interpreted as the mortgage down payment
requirement.
Financial markets. We only allow households to have collateralized debt. There is no
other type of debt available.14 Consequently households may have an incentive to take
out a mortgage even if the mortgage rate is higher than the risk-free rate. Households
with an existing mortgage, Mt can apply for a new mortgage, ϑt, but will have to keep
repaying the existing mortgage, ξt. The law of motion for the mortgage stock is as
14Mortgages constitute the vast majority of loans in the household sector in the UK and the predom-
inant investment market for British households is housing.
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follows
Mt+1 = R
MMt + ϑt − ξt (9)
Next period’s mortgage equals the existing mortgage with its interest, RM , plus the new
mortgage taken out minus the repayment on the existing mortgage15. We assume that
repayment on the existing mortgage is bounded from below– households have to pay at
least the interest on the value of the mortgage in each period. Also, there is a natural
upper bound for repayment, which is paying back all the mortgage with all its interest.
rMMt ≤ ξt ≤ RMMt (10)
As highlighted earlier, households are assumed to face a constraint on the level of mort-
gage they can take out. The maximum amount of mortgage they can have is a constant
fraction of the value of their housing.
ϑt
{
≤ (1− ψ)QtHt −RMMt if (1− ψ)QtHt > RMMt
= 0 else
(11)
It is important to see from equation (11), that the restriction on the mortgage relative
to the value of housing is only enforced at the moment of taking out a new mortgage.
As house prices fluctuate, the constraint can be violated for households with an existing
mortgage as there is no mechanism through which households could insure themselves
against this uncertainty. As a result, whenever the existing mortgage exceeds the maxi-
mum possible mortgage take-out, households cannot apply for a new mortgage. When-
ever households borrow they are also subject to the terminal condition, MT = 0, which
prevents them from borrowing more than they can repay with certainty by the end of
their life.
Uncertainty. In our baseline model households face uncertainty in two dimensions:
idiosyncratic uncertainty over labor income and aggregate uncertainty over house prices.
Following Zeldes (1989), labor income Yt at any time before retirement is exogenously
described by a combination of deterministic and random components
Yt = Y
P
t Zt log(Zt) ∼ N(−0.5σ2z , σ2z) (12)
where Y Pt is the permanent component and Zt is the transitory component. Furthermore
15RM is the gross real mortgage rate, RM = 1 + rM
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we assume that the permanent component can be described as
Y Pt = GtY
P
t−1Nt log(Nt) ∼ N(−0.5σ2n, σ2n) (13)
with Gt being a deterministic function of age and Nt is the innovation. We also assume
that the shocks (Nt and Zt) are independent.
Labor income, Yt, at any time after retirement is a constant fraction a of the last working
year’s permanent labor income. One can think of this as a pension that is wholly provided
by the employer and/or the state.
Yt = aY
P
W (14)
The log of the house price is assumed to be determined by a random walk process with
drift. In Section 4.3, we show that this assumption is consistent with the UK house
price data.
logQt+1 = d0 + logQt + log εt log(εt) ∼ N(−0.5σ2ε , σ2ε) (15)
The parametrization of uncertainty assumed in equations (12)-(13) and (15) applies in
the baseline specification
Having all the details of the model specified, we can define the vector of state variables
Ωt = (Xt, Ht,Mt, Qt, Y
P
t ) and formulate the households’s value function in period t in a
recursive form as:
Vt(Ωt) = max{Ct,It,ξt,ϑt}
U(Ct, St) + βEtVt+1(Ωt+1) (16)
subject to the budget constraint, the income processes and the form of the utility function
specified earlier.
4.2 Solution and Simulation
This life-cycle problem cannot be solved analytically, so we apply numerical techniques.
Given the finite nature of the problem, a solution exists and can be obtained by approxi-
mating optimal policy functions by backward induction. We use the backward induction
technique over the normalized value function of the households to obtain the optimal
policy functions. Expectations in the model refer to uncertain incomes and house prices,
while they are evaluated using the Gauss-Hermite approximation. Since shocks to in-
comes and prices, Zt+1, Nt+1 and εt+1 are log-normally distributed random variables
in each period, we are able to use a three-dimensional Gauss-Hermite quadrature to
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approximate the expectations as follows
EtVt+1(ωt+1) =
∫
Vt+1
(
ωt+1(Z,N, ε)
)
dF (Z)dF (N)dF (ε)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
pi
Vt+1
(
ωt+1(
√
2σZZ,
√
2σNN,
√
2σεε)
)
e−(Z
2+N2+ε2)
≈
∑
i
⊗
j
⊗
k
1
pi
wGHi w
GH
j w
GH
k Vt+1
(
ωt+1(
√
2σZZ
GH
i ,
√
2σNN
GH
j ,
√
2σεε
GH
k )
) (17)
where ωt+1 is the vector of normalized state variables
16; ZGHi , N
GH
j and ε
GH
k are the
Gauss-Hermite nodes; and wGHi , w
GH
j and w
GH
k are the corresponding weights. Using
backward induction, we get the optimal policy functions, which are shown in Figures
B.2-B.4 in the Appendix.
Having calculated these policy functions, we simulate the behavior of households over
their life-cycle. For each simulation we draw realizations for the two household-specific
shocks, the permanent income shock and the transitory income shock; as well as realiza-
tions for the aggregate house price shocks which are identical for all the households. We
disregard any kind of bequest motive: households start their life with zero wealth, and
they receive only labor income. We define different groups of households, and simulate
their behavior separately, taking into account that different cohorts experience aggregate
shocks at different ages. Altogether we define 6 cohorts between ages 20 and 80 (10-year
age interval each) and simulate 1000 households in each cohort.
Consider next how we amend the baseline model to take account of the four channels
whereby the 2009 recession may have affected household behavior, as discussed in the
introduction.
Permanent Income. A recession may occur when all households face a negative income
shock at the same time. Indeed, data from the ONS show that incomes for all UK
households fell by 5-10% in the crisis, relative to trend growth.17 We model this scenario
by assuming that the expected value of the permanent income shock, Nt, decreases from
1 to 0.9 for one period in 2009. Hence, the level of the income shock becomes
N2009 = 0.9N2008
for each household and the rest of the shocks are drawn from the same lognormal dis-
16Following Carroll (1992), variables are normalised by permanent income for ease of computation.
17We calculate this using total UK compensation of employees from the Quarterly National Accounts.
By 2011, incomes for all households fell by over 10% from their pre-crisis peak.
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tribution we have introduced in Section 4.1,
log(Nt) ∼ N(−0.5σ2n, σ2n).
Note that this aggregate, negative permanent income shock reduces income not only in
2009, but after the crisis as well.
Variance of Permanent Income. The other alternative cause of a recession is that
from 2009 onward, households experience a higher level of uncertainty around their
future labor income. We simulate this situation by considering an increase in the variance
of the permanent shocks to income. Following the calculations of Blundell, Low, and
Preston (2013) based on British data18, we assume that the variance of the permanent
income shock after 2008 becomes three times higher than before and it permanently
stays there.
log(Nt) ∼ N(−0.5σ2n, σ2n) if t < 2009
log(Nt) ∼ N(−1.5σ2n, 3σ2n) if t ≥ 2009
Note that in order to keep the expected value of the level of the shock fixed, E(Nt) = 1,
whenever we change the variance of the lognormal distribution we change the mean as
well.
Down Payment Requirement. We can think of the recession as a period with a
tightening credit market. In fact, banks changed their credit conditions on new bor-
rowing dramatically after 2008. Instead of an average 10% pre-crisis down payment
requirement for example, they demanded a 15− 20% down payment for new mortgages
after the crisis. In our model, down payment requirement is led by a single parameter,
ψ, as seen in equation (8). Hence we set this parameter accordingly:
ψ = 0.1 if t < 2009
ψ = 0.15 if t ≥ 2009
House Prices. The last alternative we consider is the collapse of house prices after
2008. Instead of our estimated random walk process for the house prices reported in
18In the empirical part of their paper, the authors use data from the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES).
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Table 7, we feed the observed house price data, shown in Figure B.1 in the Appendix,
into the model.
4.3 Model Calibration
Most of the parameter values for the life-cycle model presented above are adopted from
the existing literature. The benchmark model parameters are collected in Table B.1
in the Appendix. Here, we discuss only the values of parameters which we estimate
directly.
Income process. To obtain the age-specific component of the life-cycle income pro-
files (G), we fit a second-order age polynomial to the logarithm of cohort income data
gathered from the Family Expenditure Survey between 1992 and 2012.
ln yct = γ0 + γ1agec,t + γ2
age2c,t
10
(18)
where c refers to cohort averages. The regression results are presented in Table 6.
log yc
Age 0.110∗∗∗
(0.003)
Age2 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant 7.943∗∗∗
(0.058)
Observations 945
R-squared 0.614
Standard errors are in paren-
theses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 6: Income process
House price process. We estimate the house price process based on Nationwide’s
House Price Index adjusted for retail prices (using the Office for National Statistics
Retail Price Index) for quarters 1992q1-2012q2. We estimate an AR(1) process with
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linear trend for the logarithm of the real house price index.
logQt+1 = q0 + q1t+ ρh logQt + log εt (19)
The result of the estimation is in Table 7. The persistence parameter ρh of the log real
house price is estimated to be very close to one and the unit root tests do not reject
the null hypothesis that this parameter is actually 1. It implies that the log real house
price process can be approximated by a random walk. The estimated quarterly variance
of the house price shock, σ2ε , equals 0.0006, which corresponds to 0.0025 at an annual
frequency.
logQ
t −0.0003
(0.0002)
log Q (-1) 1.010∗∗∗ 1
(0.017) constrained
Constant -0.088 0.006∗∗
(0.179) (0.002)
σ2ε 0.0007 0.0007
Observations 84 84
R-squared 0.995
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 7: House price process
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present results from our simulation exercise for households aged
between 20 and 60. In our baseline simulation, we assume no recession in 2009 and
a random walk process for real house prices as estimated in Table 7. Then, following
Alan, Crossley, and Low (2015), we model the 2009 recession in four different ways: as a
negative shock to income, an increased uncertainty around future income, a reduction in
the supply of credit, and a fall in house prices (i.e., a reduction in housing wealth). Our
aim is to show whether different types of recessions can generate the three empirical facts
about consumption behavior we demonstrated in Sections 2 and 3: that both low and
high-leveraged households cut their consumption significantly in response to the crisis;
that high-leveraged households cut their consumption by much more than low-leveraged
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households; and that this difference is mostly driven by young households.
We do not aim for a quantitative match of the empirical and simulated moments, but,
as we demonstrated in Section 4.3, we calibrate the model to be as realistic as possible.
In Table 8, we report some basic average statistics of households’ pre-crisis (2006/2007)
leverage and wealth status both from the data and the simulated model. Without
targeting the empirical moments, the model gets close to what we observe in the data.
Mortgages in the model, though, play a more important role than in reality (see the LTI
and LTV ratios), which is the result of the simplified mortgage market in our model that
allows households to take-out additional mortgages at no cost.
Data Model
Loan-to-income (LTI) 2.4 2.8
Loan-to-Value (LTV, %) 39 59
Housing Wealth to Income 4.4 4.8
Total Wealth to Income 4.8 5.2
Table 8: Comparison of means in 2006/2007
Similarly to the empirical part before, our next step is to define subgroups of households
along two dimensions: leverage status and age. We then report our simulation results
for these subgroups. High-leveraged households are defined as those with an above-mean
pre-crisis LTI19, whereas low-leveraged households are those with a below-mean LTI. In
our model, as shown in Table 8, mean LTI is 2.8. Young households are defined as those
between 20 and 40 years of age, while old households are the ones between 40 and 60
years of age.
5.1 Results by Leverage
Figure 5 summarizes the findings from our simulations that test the four different chan-
nels we described earlier: the permanent income shock; the uncertainty shock; the credit
supply shock; and the house price shock. Each graph shows the difference between con-
sumption growth simulated under one particular shock and the consumption growth
simulated under the baseline model, i.e. no shock in 2009. The solid line in each graph
19Note that we could have chosen the median LTI, but it is very close to the mean value. In 2006/2007
the median was 2.84.
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corresponds to high leveraged households, whilst the dashed line corresponds to low
leveraged ones.
There are several things to notice here. First, all of these shocks lead to a substantial
fall in consumption growth relative to the baseline, ‘no recession’ scenario, for both
types of households. There is only one exception: low-leveraged households who face an
increase in income uncertainty barely decrease their consumption, and they only do so
in 2010. The biggest relative fall in consumption growth from 2008 to 2009 is associated
with high-leveraged households after an increase in the down payment requirement (one
can see about a 15-percentage-point gap in consumption growth relative to the baseline).
The drop in permanent income implies a fall in consumption growth for high-leveraged
households of similar size, while the other two channels lead to much smaller consumption
responses.
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Figure 5: Deviation of consumption growth from no recession
Second, consumption growth of high- and low-leveraged households (relative to the base-
line scenario) under each of the four channels are very different. In particular, the per-
manent income shock implies the highest, about a 7 percentage point difference in the
growth rate of consumption of high- and low-leveraged households. The shock to down
payment results in a difference of 3.5 percentage points, while increased uncertainty re-
30
sults in a difference of 2.5 percentage points. The house price shock, however, implies
no difference between consumption growth of high- and low-leveraged households.
If we compare these results to our empirical observations in Section 3, we conclude that
the changes in both income variance and house prices would themselves not be enough
to explain household’s consumption behavior.
More specifically, an increase in the variance of permanent income fails to explain our first
empirical observation, i.e that low-leveraged households also decrease their consumption
growth as seen in Figure 2. In a textbook version of the life-cycle model, an increase in
the uncertainty around income would affect savings positively (as discussed in Carroll
(1992) for example) leading to a decrease in consumption (or to a negative income
growth). Our model is different because households also have access to the credit market
through housing. Low-leveraged households, for example, can top-up their mortgages
easily if necessary, which means that they can secure a smooth consumption profile in
the presence of higher income uncertainty without saving more. For this reason, low-
leveraged households in our model only change their consumption behavior marginally
after an increase in income uncertainty.
Changes in house prices also fail to explain our second empirical observation, i.e. that
high-leveraged households decreased their consumption growth by more than low-leveraged
households. In particular, high- and low-leveraged households’ consumption growth is
almost identical in 2009. Independent of mortgage status, a house price drop generates a
permanent reduction in a household’s wealth. As a result, both types of households feel
less wealthy and they re-optimize their consumption plans, which includes an immediate,
similar-sized drop in their consumption.
On the contrary, and as seen in Figure 5, a permanent income shock or a down payment
shock is able to explain our first two empirical observations. Each of these shocks gen-
erate sharp drops in consumption growth both for high- and low-leveraged households,
while leading high-leveraged households to decrease their consumption growth more than
low-leveraged ones. For this reason, we solely concentrate on these two channels in the
remainder of the paper.
5.2 Results by Age
In this section, we extend our analysis of the simulation results in the same direction
as we did in our empirical analysis by examining consumption behavior by age group.
In doing so, our aim is to explore whether a permanent income or a down payment
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shock can also explain our third empirical fact: that the observed consumption growth
difference of high- and low-leveraged households is mainly driven by young households.
In Figure 6 below, we present a more disaggregated version of Figure 5 for permanent
income and down payment shocks. Here, high- and low-leveraged households are divided
into two additional subgroups based on their age. This figure can be interpreted the same
way as in Figure 5 above. Both graphs plot the difference between the consumption
growth simulated under one particular shock and the consumption growth simulated in
the baseline setting of no shock in 2009. The solid lines in each graph correspond to
high leveraged households, whilst the dashed lines correspond to low-leveraged ones.
Permanent Income. As Figure 6 shows, a negative shock to households’ permanent
income leads to a larger drop in consumption growth for the young compared to the old.
In 2009, the average consumption growth of high-leveraged young households is about
-12%, while it is about -4% for the low-leveraged young ones. At the same time, the
average consumption growth of high-leveraged old households is about -10%, while that
of the low-leveraged old is about -2%.
The reason why young households react to a permanent income drop more than old
ones can be explained by comparing their lifetime wealth. When a negative permanent
income shock hits, it affects the level of household income permanently. Consequently,
the younger the household is at the time of the income shock, the greater the negative
wealth effect that is induced by the permanently lower levels of income. Therefore, a
same-sized unexpected income shock makes young households adjust their consumption
by more than old ones.
Figure 6 also reveals a sizeable difference between the consumption growth of high-
and low-leveraged young households. Highly leveraged young households decrease their
consumption growth by around 8 percentage points more than the low-leveraged young.
Moreover, the consumption growth difference between high- and low-leveraged old house-
holds is almost identical to that of young households - which is again about 8 percentage
points.
As a result, considering the recession only as a drop in households’ permanent income
cannot explain our third empirical fact: that the observed consumption growth difference
of high- and low-leveraged households is driven by young households.
Down payment. As Figure 6 shows, a negative shock to credit supply leads to a larger
drop in consumption growth of old households relative to young ones. In 2009, the
average consumption growth of high-leveraged old households is about -16%, while that
of the low-leveraged old is roughly -14%. At the same time, the average consumption
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growth of the high-leveraged young households is about -14%, while that of the low-
leveraged old is about -9.5%.
The reason why old households are more responsive to an increase in down payment
requirements than young households can be explained by their need to top up mortgages.
Our policy functions in Figure B.4 show that old households are more likely, on average,
to take out an additional mortgage than the young. One way to think about it in our
model framework is to consider home downsizing: in order to access home equity, old
households might find it less costly to top-up their mortgages rather than to downsize,
which comes with sizeable housing transaction costs. Topping up eventually has the
same effect as downsizing, which decreases the value of households’ home equity. But in
contrast to downsizing, topping up has the benefit of keeping the housing service flow
high.20 Old households’ higher demand for topping up their mortgages induced by their
need for downsizing leads them to react more to changes in credit supply conditions.
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Figure 6: Deviation in consumption growth from no recession
Figure 6 also reveals a sizeable difference between the consumption growth of high- and
low-leveraged young households. High-leveraged young households decrease their con-
sumption growth by around 4 percentage points more than low-leveraged young house-
20As households don’t change the actual size of their house, but their home equity only.
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holds. After an unexpected increase in the down payment requirement, high-leveraged
young households, who are likely to be liquidity constrained at the same time, may find
it difficult to withdraw additional home equity to finance consumption. This could force
them to decrease their consumption by more than low-leveraged young households, who
are able to top up their mortgages even under the stricter credit conditions.
The gap between the consumption growth of high- and low-leveraged old households
is almost half the size of the gap in consumption growth of high- and low-leveraged
young households.21 High-leveraged old households decrease their consumption growth
by only around 2 percentage points more than low-leveraged old households. Our policy
functions in Figure B.4 show that new mortgage take-outs of old households vary a lot
by their leverage status. High-leveraged old households, on average, typically take out
less additional mortgage than low-leveraged ones. Consequently, an increase in the down
payment requirement could affect high- and low-leveraged old households similarly by
pushing them towards their credit limits. High-leveraged households get to their credit
limits because of their initially high mortgage levels, whilst low-leveraged ones reach
their credit limits by taking-out higher levels of additional mortgages. As a result, both
groups may decrease their consumption growth significantly after the tightening of down
payment requirements.
As such, considering the recession only as a drop in credit supply can explain our third
empirical fact. Indeed, the difference in consumption growth between high- and low-
leveraged young households is 4 percentage points, double that of old households. Our
model with a credit supply shock implies that the observed consumption growth differ-
ence of high- and low-leveraged households is driven by young households.
5.3 Evaluation of the Results
In Section 3, we showed three important empirical findings. First, both high- and
low-leveraged households cut their consumption in response to the crisis. Second, high-
leveraged households cut their consumption by more than low-leveraged ones. Third, the
sizeable differences in the consumption drop between high- and low-leveraged households
were driven by the young. After demonstrating these empirical facts, in Sections 4 and 5
we modelled the recession in four different ways and presented the corresponding results
of our simulated economy, which helped us understand the most likely causes behind
the observed consumption differences.
21Note that the consumption growth line of low-leveraged old households, the dashed black line,
coincides with the line of high-leveraged young households, the solid red line.
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We showed that both a drop in the permanent income or an increase in the down
payment requirement could potentially explain the first two empirical facts. However,
only an increase in the down payment requirement is able to match the third empirical
fact: the increased down payment requirement makes high-leveraged young households
more constrained than low-leveraged young ones, which leads them to decrease their
consumption significantly more than low-leveraged households. The difference between
high- and low-leveraged consumption growth for young households was as high at around
4 percentage points. This difference between high- and low-leveraged old households was
less pronounced, at about 2 percentage points.
The empirical findings together with our simulation results makes us conclude that the
most important driver of the empirical co-movement between household leverage and
consumption growth after 2008 is the reduction in credit supply. The main mechanism
is that after an unexpected increase in the down payment requirement, high-leveraged
young households, who are likely to be liquidity constrained at the same time, find it
difficult to withdraw additional equity from their housing. This leads them to decrease
their consumption by more than low-leveraged young households, who are able to top
up their mortgages even under the stricter credit conditions.
It is important to note that the basis of our analysis was a one-by-one examination
of individual shocks. Clearly, one might want to consider the combination of these
individual shocks in order to evaluate the quantitative effects of the financial crisis.
Our goal however was different in this paper. We wanted to determine the main driver
behind the substantial consumption growth difference between high- and low-leveraged
households in 2009, as seen in Figure 2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate households’ consumption behavior around the 2008 financial
crisis in the UK. We make two important contributions to the existing literature.
We first document the existence of a relationship between the financial crisis and dif-
ferences in households’ consumption responses based on leverage status and age. High-
leveraged households made much larger cuts to their consumption after 2008 compared
to low-leveraged ones. On average, a one unit increase in leverage, measured by the loan-
to-income ratio, is correlated with a 3-percentage point drop in consumption growth. On
the other hand, the correlation is twice as strong for young households than for old. A
one unit increase in leverage led to a 4-percentage point drop in consumption growth for
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young households, but only to a 2-percentage point drop in consumption growth for old
households. This suggests that the sizeable drop of the aggregate consumption growth,
seen in Figure 2, was likely driven by young households.
After our detailed empirical analysis, we then simulate households’ consumption behav-
ior in a structural model. We show that the observed differences in consumption growth
based on leverage status and age after 2008 are best explained by an exogenous reduction
in credit supply. Besides the negative credit market shock, we consider three counterfac-
tual channels by which a recession can affect consumption behavior: a fall in the level
of permanent income, rising uncertainty around future income and a decline in house
prices. None of these other channels can match the observed consumption patterns.
The results from this paper are very suggestive, but more work is required for a better
quantitative match of our empirical results. The most important extension of this work
is to introduce discrete housing choice to make it possible to explain lifetime borrowing
profiles better. In future work, we plan to explore this.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary Statistics
Table A.1 reports summary statistics from the FES and WAS based on cross-sectional
data.
A.2 Robustness checks for Data Exercise
A.3 Loan-to-value
As explained above, our preferred synthetic panel definition is one split by single date of
birth years and mortgagor status. Below we show that the coefficients on LTV’s are also
not affected by choice of cohort definition chosen, similar to what we obtain for LTI’s in
Table 4.
A.4 Selection
Our preferred empirical equation specification uses mortgage status to define cohorts. As
buying a house and taking out a mortgage are choice variables, there may be selection
using mortgage status in cohort definition. Moffitt (1993) suggests that one can use
deterministic variables to predict selection into the choice variable. We can then use
predicted status, rather than actual status, to group households into mortgagors and
non-mortgagors. An application of this approach is found in Attanasio, Banks, and
Tanner (2002), who use exogenous or time-invariant observables to predict shareholder
status. We follow a similar methodology to predict mortgagor status. But an additional
complication arising from our analysis is that we also need to impute mortgage levels
too. We estimate a tobit model to simultaneously predict mortgagor status and mortgage
debt levels at the household level, in the cross-sectional data. Following that, we group
cohorts into date of birth and predicted mortgagor status as described using our preferred
cohort definition.
debt∗h = κ0 + κ1ageh + κ2educh + κ3age ∗ educh + eh (A.1)
Where debt∗h is the latent variable of outstanding level of mortgage debt for household
37
T
ab
le
A
.1
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
20
06
/2
00
7
20
09
/2
01
0
A
ll
M
or
tg
ag
or
s
M
or
tg
ag
or
s
A
ll
M
or
tg
ag
or
s
M
or
tg
ag
or
s
(A
ll
)
(L
T
I>
2)
(A
ll
)
(L
T
I>
2)
W
ee
k
ly
co
n
su
m
p
ti
on
43
6
52
4
50
9
41
2
96
46
7
W
ee
k
ly
p
os
t-
ta
x
in
co
m
e
59
5
73
7
69
4
59
0
74
5
70
9
W
ee
k
ly
m
or
tg
ag
e
in
te
re
st
43
92
12
3
31
71
95
W
ee
k
ly
n
et
in
co
m
e
55
4
65
0
57
1
56
1
67
9
61
5
O
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
m
or
tg
ag
e
d
eb
t
36
,6
43
77
,5
52
11
1,
93
6
38
,4
31
89
,3
00
12
6,
58
0
G
ro
ss
h
ou
si
n
g
w
ea
lt
h
18
1,
63
0
25
6,
59
7
-
16
5,
78
1
23
0,
91
3
-
F
in
an
ci
al
w
ea
lt
h
21
,2
04
21
,0
55
-
22
,5
29
21
,2
90
-
H
ea
d
of
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
ag
e
46
43
40
47
44
41
T
ab
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
m
ea
n
va
lu
es
of
se
le
ct
ed
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fr
o
m
th
e
F
a
m
il
y
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
S
u
rv
ey
a
n
d
W
ea
lt
h
a
n
d
A
ss
et
s
S
u
rv
ey
a
t
th
e
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
le
ve
l.
A
ll
fi
n
an
ci
al
va
ri
ab
le
s
a
re
in
£
S
te
rl
in
g
a
n
d
in
re
a
l
te
rm
s.
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
is
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
h
o
u
si
n
g
.
N
et
in
co
m
e
is
in
co
m
e
n
et
of
m
or
tg
a
g
e
in
te
re
st
p
ay
m
en
ts
.
L
o
a
n
-t
o
-i
n
co
m
e
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
m
o
rt
g
a
g
e
d
eb
t
to
an
n
u
al
in
co
m
e.
F
in
an
ci
al
w
ea
lt
h
ex
cl
u
d
es
b
a
n
k
d
ep
o
si
ts
.
W
A
S
d
a
ta
fo
r
2
0
0
6
/
2
0
0
7
a
re
fr
o
m
W
av
e
1
o
f
th
e
su
rv
ey
,
w
h
ic
h
ra
n
fr
om
m
id
-2
00
6
to
m
id
-2
00
8.
2
0
0
9
/
2
0
1
0
d
a
ta
a
re
fr
o
m
W
av
e
2
o
f
th
e
su
rv
ey
,
w
h
ic
h
ra
n
fr
o
m
m
id
-2
0
0
8
to
m
id
-2
0
1
0
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
ar
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
th
e
h
ou
se
h
o
ld
h
ea
d
a
g
ed
2
1
-6
9
ye
a
rs
.
38
Cohort definition Year of birth Mortgagor /
Non-Mortgagor
[1] [2]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTVt−1 -0.128* -0.142***
(0.064) (0.039)
∆Yt 0.743*** 0.551***
(0.124) (0.117)
∆ Housing wealtht 0.123 0.074**
(0.096) (0.035)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.004 0.005
(0.020) (0.023)
Constant -0.011 -0.028**
(0.029) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 45 77
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. ∆Ct is the change in log non-housing consumption
in 2009/2010, denoted by t. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax
income, net of mortgage interest payments at t. LTVt−1 is
the ratio of mortgage debt to housing wealth in 2006/2007, de-
noted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial wealtht
are changes in housing wealth and total financial wealth re-
spectively. Controls are the change in the number of adults
and children. Each column represents a synthetic panel regres-
sion from 2 pooled years, constructed using either [1] year of
birth, or [2] year of birth, split by mortgage status.
Table A.2: Baseline results (Loan-to-Value)
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h in 2006/2007; age is a vector of age polynomials for the head of households22; educ is
a vector of indicator variables for whether the head of the household has a high-school
degree, college, or a university degree
A further complication that arises from this method is we are unable to predict wealth
for the same set of individuals, given that this variable is spliced using a secondary data
source (WAS). This is of particular importance because we would also need to predict
housing wealth for those who are predicted to have mortgage debt. We therefore opt to
exclude wealth from the re-estimation of Equation 1, as below:
∆ciˆt = φ0 + φ1
ˆLTI iˆt−1 + φ2yiˆt + φ3xiˆt + eiˆt (A.2)
Where iˆ is the cohort predicted to have mortgage debt and ˆLTI is the predicted debt
to income ratio.
Table A.3 compares results of actual to predicted mortgage status. As mentioned above,
the WAS data show that 90% of households who had a mortgage in 2006/2007 also had
one in 2009/2010. Indeed, the tobit equation correctly classifies 70% of households
who have a mortgage to also have a predicted mortgage in 2006/2007. It is therefore
unsurprising that the LTI coefficients from both regressions in Table A.3 are very similar.
There are nevertheless two drawbacks from using predicted mortgage status as our base-
line estimation. First, we are unable to control for housing wealth, which makes the LTI
coefficient endogenous. Second, there are some age groups where the model predicts
households to be mostly mortgagors and others where they are mostly non-mortgagors;
and as we retain the rule that there must be a sufficient number of household-level
data points in each panel observation, we end up with fewer observations when using
predicted status. This means imprecise estimates, leading to inefficiency.
22age, age2, ..., age5
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Actual Predicted
[1] [2]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt−1 -0.026***
(0.008)
ˆLTI(t−1) -0.030*
(0.017)
∆Yt 0.546*** 0.755***
(0.117) (0.100)
∆ Housing wealtht 0.073** -
(0.035)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.004 -
(0.023)
Constant -0.028** -0.045***
(0.012) (0.015)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 77 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ∆Ct is the change in log non-
housing consumption in 2009/2010, denoted by t.
∆Yt is the change in after-tax income, net of mort-
gage interest payments at t. LTIt−1 is the ratio of
mortgage debt to annual income in 2006/2007, de-
noted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial
wealtht are changes in housing wealth and total fi-
nancial wealth respectively. Controls are the change
in the number of adults and children. Regressions are
from a synthetic panel using 2 pooled years, where the
panel is constructed using year of birth and mortgage
status [1], or predicted mortgagor status [2]. Pre-
dicted debt and mortgagor status are calculated using
regressions equations from A.1 and A.2.
Table A.3: Using predicted mortgagor and debt
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A.5 Extending the time-period
While the main focus of the paper is on the period immediately after the financial
crisis, we check for persistence by extending the estimation period to 2011/2012. In
other words, we extend our estimation period to cover the change in consumption from
2006/2007 out to 2011/2012, rather than 2009/2010. The coefficients on LTI and LTV
continue to remain statistically significant but also become more negative (Table A.4).
This suggests that the larger cuts in spending by indebted households had not dissipated,
at least up to 2012.
A.6 LTI bands
Chart 2 above shows that highly leveraged households made a bigger adjustment to
consumption than low-leveraged households. To test whether this effect is larger as
leverage increases, we create a flag for cohorts who had a loan-to-income greater than k
in 2006/2007, where k is 2, 2.5 or 3.
∆cit = γ0 + γ1(LTI > k)it−1 + γ2∆yit + γ3∆wit + γ4xit + eit (A.3)
Table A.5 reports these results. The Table shows that for higher the loan-to-income
threshold, the coefficients become larger in magnitude. Moreover, the effects appear
non-linear– the coefficient of -0.049 more than doubles when moving from an LTI > 2 to
an LTI > 3. These numbers are consistent with previous analysis showing a correlation
between households with high pre-crisis loan-to-income ratios and a subsequent fall in
consumption growth after the crisis– and that the effect may be non-linear.
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Time period, t: 2009/2010 2009/2010 2011/2012 2011/2012
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt -0.026*** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.007)
LTVt -0.142*** -0.166***
(0.039) (0.037)
∆Yt 0.546*** 0.551*** 0.572*** 0.569***
(0.117) (0.117) (0.101) (0.102)
∆ Housing wealth(t) 0.073** 0.074** 0.015 0.016
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)
∆ Financial wealth(t) 0.004 0.005 -0.015 -0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant -0.028** -0.028** -0.032** -0.031**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77 77 74 74
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column
represents a regression for a different time period. ∆Ct is the change in log non-housing
consumption in t; where t is 2009/2010 [column 1 & 3], or 2011/12 [column 2 & 4]
respectively. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax income, net of mortgage interest payments
at t. LTIt−1 is the ratio of mortgage debt to annual income in 2006/2007, denoted by
t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht and ∆Financial wealtht are changes in housing wealth and
total financial wealth respectively. Controls are the change in the number of adults and
children. Regressions are from a synthetic panel using 2 pooled years, where the panel is
constructed using year of birth and mortgage status.
Table A.4: Longer time-period
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LTI>2 LTI>2.5 LTI>3
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent var: ∆Ct
LTIt > 2 -0.049**
(0.020)
LTIt > 2.5 -0.065**
(0.027)
LTIt > 3 -0.132***
(0.033)
∆Yt 0.529*** 0.546*** 0.566***
(0.118) (0.118) (0.116)
∆ Housing wealtht 0.086** 0.089** 0.091***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
∆ Financial wealtht 0.008 0.006 -0.001
(0.025) (0.024) (0.019)
Constant -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.042***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 77 77 77
Table A.5: LTI Bands
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. ∆Ct is the change in log non-housing consumption in
2009/2010, denoted by t. ∆Yt is the change in after-tax income,
net of mortgage interest payments at t. LTIt−1 > 2, 2.5, and 3 are
variables for the proportion of households in each cohort that have
an outstanding mortgage to income ratio of more than 2, 2.5 or
3 respectively in 2006/2007, denoted by t− 1. ∆Housing wealtht
and ∆Financial wealtht are changes in housing wealth and total
financial wealth respectively. Controls are the change in the num-
ber of adults and children. Regressions are from a synthetic panel
using 2 pooled years, where the panel is constructed using year of
birth and mortgage status.
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B Simulation
B.1 Model Parameters
The model parameters are presented in Table B.1.
B.2 Real House Prices
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Figure B.1: Real house price evolution
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B.3 Policy Functions
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Figure B.2: Policy Functions for Liquid Savings
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Figure B.3: Policy Functions for Housing Invesetment
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Figure B.4: Policy Functions for New Mortgage
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B.4 Baseline Simulation Results
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Figure B.5: Baseline Results
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